The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09721-8zbMATH Open1428.91011OpenAlexW2973462378MaRDI QIDQ2011373FDOQ2011373

Authors: Aldo Pignataro 

Publication date: 6 December 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09721-8

Recommendations

• Competitive persuasive advertising under consumer loss aversion
• Regular prices and sales
• Inferior products and profitable deception
• Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
• Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a ``cover version of the Heidhues-Kőszegi-Rabin model

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionenforcementdeceptive advertising

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Marketing, advertising (90B60) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Regular prices and sales
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion
• The social value of information on product quality

Cited In (4)

• Competitive persuasive advertising under consumer loss aversion
• On adverse effects of consumers' attaching greater importance to firms' ethical conduct
• Inferior products and profitable deception
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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