Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
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Recommendations
- A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
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Cites work
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
- A model of reference-dependent preferences
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
- Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
- Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
- Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products
- Loss aversion equilibrium
- Monopoly and product quality
- Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a ``cover version of the Heidhues-Kőszegi-Rabin model
- Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
- Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
- Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Regular prices and sales
Cited in
(19)- The selling strategy on dual-channel on-line discounts considering loss preferences
- Price discrimination and majority voting
- SELLING IN ADVANCE TO LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS
- Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products
- Loss aversion in taste-based employee discrimination: evidence from a choice experiment
- Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a ``cover version of the Heidhues-Kőszegi-Rabin model
- Nonlinear pricing, biased consumers, and regulatory policy
- Regular prices and sales
- Service Pricing with Loss-Averse Customers
- Naïveté-based discrimination
- The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies
- Equilibrium strategies and pricing for a congested system with opaque price and loss-averse customers
- Price discrimination with robust beliefs
- Price discrimination based on purchase behavior and service cost in competitive channels
- Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs
- Pricing with bargain hunting consumers
- Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
- Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers
- A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
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