A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points

DOI10.3982/TE1737zbMATH Open1395.91196MaRDI QIDQ4586041FDOQ4586041

Authors: Juan Carlos Carbajal, Jeffrey C. Ely 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationloss aversionproduct line designreference-dependent preferencesreference consumption planself-confirming contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (11)

• Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products
• Nonlinear pricing, biased consumers, and regulatory policy
• Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a ``cover version of the Heidhues-Kőszegi-Rabin model
• Regular prices and sales
• Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
• How Endogenization of the Reference Point Affects Loss Aversion: A Study of Portfolio Selection
• Loss Aversion with a State-Dependent Reference Point
• On the consensus effect
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
• Price discrimination with loss averse consumers

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