Fairness and desert in tournaments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.01.002zbMATH Open1230.91010OpenAlexW3121738110MaRDI QIDQ980962FDOQ980962

Authors: David M. Gill, Rebecca Stone 

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/79210/1/0903.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

reference pointloss aversionequitypsychological game theorytournamentdesertstatusreference-dependent preferencesrelative performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Dynamic psychological games
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• A theory of reciprocity
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
• Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty

Cited In (14)

• Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
• Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
• Social comparison and risk taking behavior
• Gender differences and dynamics in competition: The role of luck
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion
• Pay inequity effects on back-office employees' job performances: the case of a large insurance firm
• Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
• Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players
• Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
• Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
• Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments
• Innovation contests with risk‐averse participants
• When do the expectations of others matter? Experimental evidence on distributional justice and guilt aversion
• Expectations-based loss aversion in contests

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