The nature of tournaments
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Publication:690681
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0523-4zbMath1262.91101OpenAlexW3122476892MaRDI QIDQ690681
Robert J. Akerlof, Richard T. Holden
Publication date: 28 November 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0523-4
Related Items (20)
An envelope approach to tournament design ⋮ Optimal prize allocations in group contests ⋮ Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives ⋮ On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Assortative matching by lottery contests ⋮ Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments? ⋮ Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ All-pay matching contests ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs ⋮ Multiple prizes in research tournaments ⋮ Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium ⋮ Tournament rewards and heavy tails ⋮ Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions ⋮ Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests ⋮ Large tournament games ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Inequality and conflict outbreak
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- Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
- On the Concavity of the Consumption Function
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