Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems

DOI10.1007/BF01236006zbMath0825.90170MaRDI QIDQ1186999

T. V. S. Ramamohan Rao

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

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• Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
• Similarities and differences in the nonlinear flow behavior of simple and of molecular liquids
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• Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• Distribution and Growth as a Differential Game between Workers and Capitalists

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