Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- Continuity in auction design
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
This page was built for publication: Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2491877)