Dynamic yardstick mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.02.004MaRDI QIDQ2491877zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 29 May 2006

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentRatchet effectcorrelated mechanismsshort- and long-term contractsYardstick regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Continuity in auction design
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design

Cited in

(1)

• On the dynamic optimality of yardstick regulation

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