Dynamic moral hazard without commitment

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0494-6zbMath1388.91118OpenAlexW1537560783MaRDI QIDQ267083

Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 8 April 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1989.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommitmentprincipal-agentcash flow diversiondynamic moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Conditions for optimality in dynamic programming and for the limit of n-stage optimal policies to be optimal
• Smoothness of the Policy Function in Discrete Time Economic Models
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
• Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard

This page was built for publication: Dynamic moral hazard without commitment