Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations

DOI10.1007/PL00004132MaRDI QIDQ5942329zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher Sleet, Şevin Yeltekin

Publication date 28 August 2001

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004132

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contractslayoffsseparations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
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• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?
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