The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?

DOI10.1007/S00712-009-0080-0MaRDI QIDQ735171zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Bac, Serife Genc

Publication date 21 October 2009

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0080-0

zbMATH Keywords

contractsefficient screeningFrench labor law reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
• Nonrevelation in Employment Contracts
• The provision of wage incentives: a structural estimation using contracts variation
• Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
• DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON-THE-JOB SEARCH

Cites work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• The Effect of Job Heterogeneity on Reservation Wages

Cited in

(2)

• The effects of partial employment protection reforms: evidence from Italy
• Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats

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