Persistent private information
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(44)- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- Moral hazard under ambiguity
- A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- Implications of uncertainty for optimal policies
- Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model
- Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- Equilibrium in risk-sharing games
- Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
- The curse of long horizons
- Relational contracts in a persistent environment
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Partial differential equation models in macroeconomics
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
- Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
- Value of Persistent Information
- Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
- Practical Everlasting Privacy
- Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1
- Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
- Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
- Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
- Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size
- Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
- Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
- Optimal contract design via relaxation: application to the problem of brokerage fee for a client with private signal
- Setbacks, shutdowns, and overruns
- Sequential optimal contracting in continuous time
- A note on persistent private information
- Repeated moral hazard with persistence
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
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