Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
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Cites work
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
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- Dynamic sender-receiver games
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- Insurance and taxation over the life cycle
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- On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
- Opportunity and Social Mobility
- Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
- Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption
- Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
- Optimal taxation with endogenous insurance markets
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Persistent private information
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
- Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
- Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- What Do Data on Millions of U.S. Workers Reveal About Lifecycle Earnings Dynamics?
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