Fiscal rules and discretion under persistent shocks

DOI10.3982/ECTA11207MaRDI QIDQ4615887zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marina Halac, Pierre Yared

Publication date 29 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11207

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric and private informationhyperbolic discountingmacroeconomic policymechanism designpolitical economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
• When is discretionary fiscal policy effective?
• The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
• The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
• Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Fiscal rules as bargaining chips
• BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
• Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• Dynamically consistent menu preferences
• Interregional spillovers and optimal budget institutions under asymmetric information
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment

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