Non-linear capital taxation without commitment

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDS001MaRDI QIDQ4610560zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors E. Farhi, Christopher Sleet, Iván Werning, Şevin Yeltekin

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82875

zbMATH Keywords

capital taxationMirrleespolitical economyprogressivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints
• Capital income taxation and the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• Taxation without commitment
• Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy

Cited in

(16)

• The commitment value of funding pensions
• Optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents
• Implications of uncertainty for optimal policies
• Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Labour Supply in a Two-Period Model: The Effect of a Nonlinear Progressive Income Tax
• Entrepreneurial labor and capital taxation
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
• Robust predictions in dynamic policy games
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy
• Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes

This page was built for publication: Non-linear capital taxation without commitment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4610560)