Robust predictions in dynamic policy games

DOI10.3982/TE4489MaRDI QIDQ6664091FDO

Authors Juan Passadore, Juan Pablo Xandri

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessmultiple equilibriacorrelated equilibriummoment inequalitiespolicy games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
• Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
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• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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