Robust predictions in dynamic policy games
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Publication:6664091
DOI10.3982/TE4489MaRDI QIDQ6664091FDOQ6664091
Juan Passadore, Juan Pablo Xandri
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Efficient Sovereign Default
- Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
- The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information
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