Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
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Recommendations
Cited in
(68)- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Implementation via rights structures
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
- Workup
- Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Experimental design to persuade
- Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Incentive compatible mechanism for influential agent selection
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Implementation with partial provability
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Implementation with evidence
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Selling with evidence
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize
- Implementation with partial verification
- Long information design
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Screening for experiments
- Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
- Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- Regret-minimizing project choice
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
- Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
- Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
- Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
- Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
- Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
- Full surplus extraction and consideration sets
- Robust predictions and hard information in the market for lemons
- Evidence games: lying aversion and commitment
- Unidirectional incentive compatibility
- Project selection with partially verifiable information
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Verifiable disclosure
- Covert learning and disclosure
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
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