Covert learning and disclosure

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2026.106179MaRDI QIDQ7286805zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Matteo Escudé

Publication date 23 June 2026

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2026.106179

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Costly miscalibration
• Disclosure and choice
• Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
• Evidence design and voluntary disclosure
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information

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