Recommendations
- An easier way to calibrate.
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
- Calibrated forecasting and merging
- On calibration error of randomized forecasting algorithms
Cited in
(12)- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Noisy persuasion
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- The persuasion duality
- Persuasion without ex-post commitment
- Topology-free type structures with conditioning events
- Lying in persuasion
- Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
- Covert learning and disclosure
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