Costly miscalibration

DOI10.3982/TE3991MaRDI QIDQ5164464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3991

zbMATH Keywords

calibrationcommitmentcheap talkBayesian persuasione-commerce platformmiscalibrationpromotion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• The persuasion duality
• Noisy persuasion

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