Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0097MaRDI QIDQ2365336zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover, Richard A. Young

Publication date 23 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0097

zbMATH Keywords

applied agency modelinformation structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

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(4)

• On the types of information and mechanism design
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
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• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages

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