Collective decision through an informed mediator

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105817MaRDI QIDQ6564042zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yunan Li, Xingtan Zhang

Publication date 28 June 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105817

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcollective decisioncross-subsidization mechanismprovision of public goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Decision theory (91B06) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Costly verification in collective decisions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Informed intermediaries
• Intermediation with Costly Bilateral Exchange
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Pollution claim settlements under correlated information
• Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

Cited in

(1)

• Resilient Information Aggregation

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