Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
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- An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem
- Large nonanonymous repeated games
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
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- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
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- Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Information aggregation in large collective purchases
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship
- The veil of public ignorance
- Efficient compromising
- Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- The value of a new idea: Knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure
- On the size and structure of group cooperation
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