Bargaining on behalf of a constituency

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2631MaRDI QIDQ1581189zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hongbin Cai

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2631

zbMATH Keywords

2-stage bargaining gameagentstrong refinement of sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The author considers a 2-stage bargaining game. On one side of the bargaining is a constituency, represented by an agent; on the other side, an adversary. After the first stage of bargaining, the constituency can retain or replace the agent. In general, a continuum of sequential equilibria exists for this game. The paper considers a strong refinement of sequential equilibrium, then characterizes the equilibria that survive refinement. The equilibria most likely to be played display considerable inefficiency, which takes the form of delayed agreement. The paper includes an application to the labor-management negotiations, including the bitter UAW strike of 1945-46.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(12)

• Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
• Delegation and threat in bargaining
• Demand bargaining in legislatures
• A group bargaining solution
• Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining
• Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives
• Stakeholder bargaining games
• Distortion-free logrolling mechanism
• Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
• Group bargaining: a model of international treaty ratification
• Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification
• Bargaining: Separately or together?

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