Bargaining on behalf of a constituency (Q1581189)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1508332
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Bargaining on behalf of a constituency |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1508332 |
Statements
Bargaining on behalf of a constituency (English)
0 references
20 August 2001
0 references
The author considers a 2-stage bargaining game. On one side of the bargaining is a constituency, represented by an agent; on the other side, an adversary. After the first stage of bargaining, the constituency can retain or replace the agent. In general, a continuum of sequential equilibria exists for this game. The paper considers a strong refinement of sequential equilibrium, then characterizes the equilibria that survive refinement. The equilibria most likely to be played display considerable inefficiency, which takes the form of delayed agreement. The paper includes an application to the labor-management negotiations, including the bitter UAW strike of 1945-46.
0 references
2-stage bargaining game
0 references
agent
0 references
strong refinement of sequential equilibrium
0 references
0.7705029249191284
0 references
0.7684943675994873
0 references
0.7646596431732178
0 references
0.7588616013526917
0 references
0.754679799079895
0 references
