Distortion-free logrolling mechanism
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Publication:4644776
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_38zbMATH Open1419.91342OpenAlexW49774626MaRDI QIDQ4644776FDOQ4644776
Authors: Hannu Vartiainen
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_38
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Cites Work
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- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Bargaining with many players: a limit result
- Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set bridges time-preferences to the Nash solution
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