Distortion-free logrolling mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_38MaRDI QIDQ4644776zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date 8 January 2019

Published in Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_38

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerbargaining gamebargaining solutionparty systemcommon resource

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
• Bargaining with many players: a limit result
• Multilateral Bargaining
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Time Preference
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set bridges time-preferences to the Nash solution

Cited in

(1)

• Reflections on power, voting, and voting power

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