Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
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Publication:4644753
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- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- A review of some recent results on power indices
- Axiomatizations of public good indices with a priori unions
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Causation and the measurement of power
- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- Constrained monotonicity and the measurement of power
- Degrees of causation
- Distortion-free logrolling mechanism
- FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND WEIGHTED MONOTONICITY OF POWER
- Fair majorities in proportional voting
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- Indirect control of corporations
- Inferior players in simple games
- Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
- Monotonicity of power and power measures
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- Noncooperative selection of the core
- Power distribution in the Weimar Reichstag in 1919--1933
- Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
- Social choice and individual values
- Strict proportional power in voting bodies
- The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
- The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power
- The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
- Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining
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