Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2007.02.045MaRDI QIDQ2426537zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons

Publication date 22 April 2008

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.045

zbMATH Keywords

persuasiondesirability relationcircumstantial and standard power indicesOwen's multilinear extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of simple games
• A decisiveness index for simple games
• Inferior players in simple games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
• Semivalue versatility and applications
• Semivalues as power indices.
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• \(\alpha\)-decisiveness in simple games

Cited in

(7)

• Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
• On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
• Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
• Structural control in weighted voting games
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory

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