Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2426537
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2007.02.045zbMATH Open1135.91010OpenAlexW2079982674MaRDI QIDQ2426537FDOQ2426537
Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 22 April 2008
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.045
Recommendations
persuasiondesirability relationcircumstantial and standard power indicesOwen's multilinear extension
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
- A class of simple games
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Semivalues as power indices.
- Inferior players in simple games
- \(\alpha\)-decisiveness in simple games
- A decisiveness index for simple games
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Semivalue versatility and applications
Cited In (7)
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power
- Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
This page was built for publication: Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2426537)
