Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
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Publication:2178642
DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00681-5zbMATH Open1437.91034arXiv1511.04437OpenAlexW3103496305WikidataQ127856252 ScholiaQ127856252MaRDI QIDQ2178642FDOQ2178642
Vladimir V. Mazalov, Alekseĭ Yu. Kondrat'ev
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the filled ballot paper profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore the properties of the designed ranking procedure.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.04437
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