Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players
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Cites work
- A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- On the Enumeration of Majority Games
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
Cited in
(17)- Stable governments and the semistrict core
- An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions
- Characterization of coalitionally ordered games
- The desirability relation of simple games
- A complete classification of equational classes of threshold functions included in clones
- A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions
- A consensus model of political decision-making
- Existence of dominant players and their role in the formation of a cabinet coalition
- Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation
- On connected coalitions in dominated simple games
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
- On the use of binary decision diagrams for solving problems on simple games
- Simple games and magic squares
- A relation-algebraic approach to simple games
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
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