Stable governments and the semistrict core
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Publication:2427125
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003zbMath1137.91315OpenAlexW2013440025MaRDI QIDQ2427125
Dinko Dimitrov, Claus-Jochen Haake
Publication date: 8 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315530
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