Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0487-5zbMATH Open1388.91027OpenAlexW2253384167MaRDI QIDQ524960FDOQ524960

Authors: Dominik Karos 

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5

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zbMATH Keywords

ordinal gamesbargaining with claimscore stable partitionsgames with non-transferable utility in partition function form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited In (4)

• A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
• Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
• Nash bargaining solution under externalities
• Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games

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