Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0487-5MaRDI QIDQ524960zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominik Karos

Publication date 27 April 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal gamesbargaining with claimscore stable partitionsgames with non-transferable utility in partition function form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

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• Rationing in the presence of baselines
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games
• The bargaining problem
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms

Cited in

(4)

• Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
• A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
• Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
• Nash bargaining solution under externalities

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