On the existence and formation of partnerships in a game

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0004MaRDI QIDQ1913285zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesc Carreras

Publication date 22 May 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0004

zbMATH Keywords

minimal winning coalitionspartnership in cooperative gamesShapley valuevoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• On the convenience to form coalitions or partnerships in simple games
• Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue
• Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
• Partnership formation and multinomial values

Cited in

(10)

• Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
• Rejoinder on: Transversality of the Shapley value
• Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
• Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• Partnership formation and multinomial values
• A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
• Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
• On the convenience to form coalitions or partnerships in simple games
• Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

This page was built for publication: On the existence and formation of partnerships in a game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1913285)