Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2021.08.024MaRDI QIDQ2235261zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adin Safokem, Issofa Moyouwou, Aurelien Y. Mekuko

Publication date 21 October 2021

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.08.024

zbMATH Keywords

public good indexmergingHoller-Packel indexsupplementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

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• Sharing the cost of redundant items
• The cost of getting local monotonicity
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Cited in

(5)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3945821 (Why is no real title available?)
• On public values and power indices
• Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies
• The power of closeness in a network
• The Deegan-Packel and Holler-Packel indices: partnership equivalence and the entry of a new voter

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