A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139269 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3079000 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players
- Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
- Theory of games and economic behavior.
- When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
- \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
- n-Person games with only 1, n? 1, and n-person coalitions
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