The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1982.9989922zbMath0485.92021OpenAlexW4248498070MaRDI QIDQ3945990

James P. Kahan, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 1982

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1982.9989922

zbMATH Keywords

characteristic function gamesestimation proceduresmeasures of goodness of fit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (3)

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values ⋮ Encouraging a coalition formation ⋮ A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model

Cites Work

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• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Some targets for mathematical psychology
• When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
• Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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