scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999

zbMATH Open0050.14406MaRDI QIDQ5817872FDOQ5817872

Authors: Donald B. Gillies 

Publication date: 1953

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

zbMATH Keywords

probability theory

Cited In (96)

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• Convex covers of symmetric games
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• New characterizations for largeness of the core
• A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
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• A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player
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• Discriminatory von Neumann--Morgenstern solutions
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• Sharing a collective probability of success
• Meaningful and meaningless solutions for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• A competitive test of the descriptive accuracy of the characteristic function, power function, and Shapley value based function
• Minimal balanced collections and their application to core stability and other topics of game theory
• The coming of game theory
• Distributive solutions for absolutely stable games
• Linear values for interior operator games
• The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
• Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods
• On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games
• Allocating revenues in a Smart TV ecosystem
• An application of cooperative game among container terminals of one port
• Chinese postman games with multi-located players
• The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
• A cooperative game with envy
• Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations
• A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties
• The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: upstream compensation method
• A matching value for cooperative games
• DEA and cooperative game theory
• Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values
• Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong

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