The paper investigates the relationship between compromise stability of transferable utility games and efficient payoff vectors; specifically, the main results study the structure of the generators of the core cover, and conditions ensuring that the game is compromise stable.
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Cites work
- A bankruptcy approach to the core cover
- A quadratic programming model for product configuration optimization
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- Clan games
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- Cores of convex games
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- Properties of 1-convex n-person games
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- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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