Autonomous coalitions

DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1951-0MaRDI QIDQ256638zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stéphane Gonzalez, Michel Grabisch

Publication date 9 March 2016

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1951-0

zbMATH Keywords

aspiration coreautonomous coalitionsbalancednessc-corecoalition formationcooperative gamecore

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Balanced manifolds of coalitions of classic cooperative games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Dual cores and effectivity functions
• USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
• Cores of games with restricted cooperation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999 (Why is no real title available?)
• Axiomatizing core extensions
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Nonempty core-type solutions over balanced coalitions in TU-games
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• On the vertices of the \(k\)-additive core
• Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus
• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cited in

(5)

• Optimal deterrence of cooperation
• Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games
• An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games
• Fair profit division
• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective

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