Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions

DOI10.1016/J.INS.2019.09.019MaRDI QIDQ1999211zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jia-Cai Liu, Wen-Jian Zhao, Benjamin Lev, Dengfeng Li, Jiuh-Biing Sheu, Yong-Wu Dai

Publication date 18 March 2021

Published in Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2019.09.019

zbMATH Keywords

equal contribution division valueequal surplus division valueexcess vectorleast square methodlogistics enterpriseprofit distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cited in

(2)

• Improved weighted Shapley Value model for the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition
• Some excess-based solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility

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