Some excess-based solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility

DOI10.1142/S021919891340029XMaRDI QIDQ5396047zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Krishna Chaitanya Vanam, Nandyala Hemachandra

Publication date 5 February 2014

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891340029x

zbMATH Keywords

approximate corecoalitional monotonicitycost sharingmin-maxnucleolusShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• Core and monotonic allocation methods.
• Cores of convex games
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game

Cited in

(3)

• Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
• Individual weighted excess and least square values
• Fair cost savings allocation in two-stage fixed-cost transportation problem

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