Cooperative game solution concepts to a cost allocation problem.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00232-5zbMath1068.91527OpenAlexW2036581020WikidataQ127110003 ScholiaQ127110003MaRDI QIDQ1582186

Lech Kruś, Piotr Bronisz

Publication date: 2000

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00232-5

zbMATH Keywords

Mathematical modelingCost allocationCooperative games with side payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case ⋮ Common mistakes in computing the nucleolus ⋮ Allocating the fixed cost: an approach based on data envelopment analysis and cooperative game ⋮ Enjoying cooperative games: the \textbf{R} package \textbf{GameTheory} ⋮ Collaborating freight forwarding enterprises

Cites Work

• On the completeness and constructiveness of parametric characterizations to vector optimization problems
• Multiple criteria decision analysis in regional planning. Concepts, methods and applications
• The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
• A mathematical basis for satisficing decision making
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
• Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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