Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
From MaRDI portal
Publication:296806
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.03.044zbMATH Open1338.91083OpenAlexW1980901192MaRDI QIDQ296806FDOQ296806
Authors: M. J. Albizuri, A. Sarachu, H. Díez
Publication date: 23 June 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.03.044
Recommendations
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods
- A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption
- Monotonic surplus sharing: Characterization results
- A Nash equilibrium solution for the discrete two-person cost sharing problem
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164504
- The Shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games
- On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
- Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity
- Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
- Ordinal cost sharing
- Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
- Cooperative game solution concepts to a cost allocation problem.
- Coherent cost-sharing rules
- The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
- A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
- Additive rules in discrete allocation problems
- Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
- An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation
- The Determination of Marginal Cost Prices under a Set of Axioms
- Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- Potential, Consistency, and Cost Allocation Prices
- A value for multichoice games
- Cost allocation and convex data envelopment
Cited In (9)
- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods
- Coherent cost-sharing rules
- Sensibility concept for the discrete case in the cost sharing problem
- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
- The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
This page was built for publication: Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q296806)