Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
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Publication:3960428
DOI10.1287/moor.7.1.40zbMath0496.90016MaRDI QIDQ3960428
Leonard J. Mirman, Yair Tauman
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.40
Shapley value; existence theorem; existence of equilibrium; nonatomic games; price mechanism; equitable cost sharing pricing
91A12: Cooperative games
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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