Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
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Publication:3960428
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(39)- Prices in mixed cost allocation problems
- Distributive production sets and equilibria with increasing returns
- Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
- Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
- Potentials in cooperative TU-games
- Asymmetric cost sharing mechanisms
- Systemic risk components and deposit insurance premia
- Using Aumann-Shapley values to allocate insurance risk: the case of inhomogeneous losses
- Nearly serial sharing methods
- An optimal congestion and cost-sharing pricing scheme for multiclass services
- Bargaining with an agenda
- Cost sharing: The nondifferentiable case
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
- Distributive and additive costsharing of an homogeneous good
- Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach
- Risk capital allocation and cooperative pricing of insurance liabilities.
- A value for multichoice games
- Cost allocation and convex data envelopment
- Applied cost allocation: the DEA-Aumann-Shapley approach
- A sufficient condition on f for (f after mu) to be in pNAD
- A generalization of the Aumann-Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems
- The continuity of the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism
- On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
- Value allocation with economies of scale
- The Moulin-Shenker rule
- Cost sharing in production economies
- Cooperative behavior in a competitive market
- Ordinal proportional cost sharing
- Prices for homogeneous cost functions
- Risk redistribution games with dual utilities
- To split or not to split: Capital allocation with convex risk measures
- Proportional allocation schemes for tour costs
- Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices
- Aumann-Shapley prices as a Scarf social equilibrium
- Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation
- Fair cost allocation schemes
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