Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices

DOI10.1287/MOOR.7.1.40MaRDI QIDQ3960428zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonard J. Mirman, Yair Tauman

Publication date 1982

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.40

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenonatomic gamesexistence theoremexistence of equilibriumprice mechanismequitable cost sharing pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited in

(39)

• Prices in mixed cost allocation problems
• Distributive production sets and equilibria with increasing returns
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
• Asymmetric cost sharing mechanisms
• Systemic risk components and deposit insurance premia
• Using Aumann-Shapley values to allocate insurance risk: the case of inhomogeneous losses
• Nearly serial sharing methods
• An optimal congestion and cost-sharing pricing scheme for multiclass services
• Bargaining with an agenda
• Cost sharing: The nondifferentiable case
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• Distributive and additive costsharing of an homogeneous good
• Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
• Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
• Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach
• Risk capital allocation and cooperative pricing of insurance liabilities.
• A value for multichoice games
• Cost allocation and convex data envelopment
• Applied cost allocation: the DEA-Aumann-Shapley approach
• A sufficient condition on f for (f after mu) to be in pNAD
• A generalization of the Aumann-Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems
• The continuity of the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Value allocation with economies of scale
• The Moulin-Shenker rule
• Cost sharing in production economies
• Cooperative behavior in a competitive market
• Ordinal proportional cost sharing
• Prices for homogeneous cost functions
• Risk redistribution games with dual utilities
• To split or not to split: Capital allocation with convex risk measures
• Proportional allocation schemes for tour costs
• Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices
• Aumann-Shapley prices as a Scarf social equilibrium
• Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation
• Fair cost allocation schemes

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