A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0320-3MaRDI QIDQ2376076zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau

Publication date 26 June 2013

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3

zbMATH Keywords

cost-sharing modeldummy axiomflow methodstechnological cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Allocation rules for network games
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• Cost sharing with multiple technologies
• Marginalist and efficient values for TU games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
• Partially symmetric values.
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
• The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
• The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
• Value theory without symmetry

Cited in

(9)

• Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
• Stable cost sharing in production allocation games
• A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability
• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games
• Cost sharing with multiple technologies
• Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents

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