A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0320-3zbMATH Open1269.91051OpenAlexW2015298863MaRDI QIDQ2376076FDOQ2376076
Authors: Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau 
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3
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Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
- Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Allocation rules for network games
- On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
- Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
- The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
- A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
- Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
- On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
- Value theory without symmetry
- The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
- Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
- The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms
- Marginalist and efficient values for TU games
- Cost sharing with multiple technologies
- Partially symmetric values.
Cited In (9)
- Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
- Stable cost sharing in production allocation games
- A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability
- Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
- Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
- Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
- Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games
- Cost sharing with multiple technologies
- Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents
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