Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2103588
Recommendations
- The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- A characterization of the multi-choice Shapley value with partially consistent property
- A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
- Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
Cites work
- A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
- A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
- A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
- A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
- A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
- A value for multichoice games
- Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
- Characterizations of a multi-choice value
- Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
- Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
- Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
- Multi-choice clan games and their core
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- On the serial cost sharing rule
- On weighted Shapley values
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Serial Cost Sharing
- Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
- Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
- The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
- The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
- The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
- The multichoice coalition value
- The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
Cited in
(14)- Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
- Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
- Modelling the emergence of an egalitarian society in the n-player game framework
- Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
- \textit{Hukou} identity and fairness in the ultimatum game
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure
- Marginal Contributions in Games with Externalities
- Cost allocation in energy distribution networks
- Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games
- Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach
- Fair allocation in hierarchies: a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism
- Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
- A Myerson value for multi-choice games with a communication network
This page was built for publication: Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2103588)
