Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01412-8zbMATH Open1505.91041OpenAlexW4281258796MaRDI QIDQ2103588FDOQ2103588

Authors: David Lowing, Kevin Techer 

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01412-8

Recommendations

• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• A characterization of the multi-choice Shapley value with partially consistent property
• A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
• Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Serial Cost Sharing
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• On weighted Shapley values
• Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach
• A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• Multi-choice clan games and their core
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
• A value for multichoice games
• Characterizations of a multi-choice value
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• On the serial cost sharing rule
• Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
• The multichoice coalition value
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
• Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations

Cited In (9)

• \textit{Hukou} identity and fairness in the ultimatum game
• Cost allocation in energy distribution networks
• Marginal Contributions in Games with Externalities
• Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
• Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
• Modelling the emergence of an egalitarian society in the \(n\)-player game framework
• Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure

This page was built for publication: Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2103588)