Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach
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Publication:2466774
DOI10.1007/s00186-006-0109-xzbMath1154.91319OpenAlexW2114828263MaRDI QIDQ2466774
Publication date: 16 January 2008
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0109-x
Related Items (25)
A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games ⋮ Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ The core of bicapacities and bipolar games ⋮ The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure ⋮ Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure ⋮ Two-step coalition values for multichoice games ⋮ On importance indices in multicriteria decision making ⋮ A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games ⋮ Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures ⋮ A model of influence in a social network ⋮ Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games ⋮ Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value ⋮ Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ The consistent value of fuzzy games ⋮ Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws ⋮ The interaction transform for functions on lattices ⋮ Rooted-tree solutions for tree games ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
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