Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games
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Publication:300870
DOI10.1007/s10100-011-0201-zzbMath1339.91011OpenAlexW1991093336MaRDI QIDQ300870
Publication date: 29 June 2016
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-011-0201-z
Related Items (2)
The coincidences among the semicore and the dominance core ⋮ The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results
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