Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.08.003zbMATH Open1457.91190OpenAlexW3086292509MaRDI QIDQ2222207FDOQ2222207
Authors: M. J. Albizuri, B. J. Dietzenbacher, José M. Zarzuelo
Publication date: 26 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/31495394/2019_033.pdf
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bargaining with claimsconstrained Kalai solutionconstrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionconstrained Nash solutionindependence of higher claimsindependence of irrelevant claims
Cites Work
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- Serial Cost Sharing
- The bargaining problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bargaining problems with claims
- A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems
- An alternative solution to bargaining problems with claims
- Resolving a Conflict Situation with a Reference Outcome: An Axiomatic Model
- The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems
- The Nash rationing problem
- The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
- Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
- Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims
- An alternative characterization of the extended claim-egalitarian solution
- Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
Cited In (8)
- Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
- Generalizing the constrained equal awards rule
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- The equal split-off set for NTU-games
- Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms
- A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems
- Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution
- Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
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