Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms

DOI10.1007/S10479-020-03828-WMaRDI QIDQ2095941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 15 November 2022

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03828-w

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic analysisbargaining theoryNTU-bankruptcy problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
• NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle
• Generalizing the constrained equal awards rule
• A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems
• Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Cites work

• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility
• Bargaining problems with claims
• Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
• Characterizations of bargaining solutions by properties of their status quo sets
• Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
• Duality, area-considerations, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
• Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem
• Monotonicity and independence axioms
• Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points
• Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
• NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
• The bargaining problem
• The bargaining problem with an uncertain conflict outcome
• The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems

Cited in

(12)

• Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
• Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
• NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle
• Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
• Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
• The minimal overlap rule: restrictions on mergers for creditors' consensus
• The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
• On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
• Generalizing the constrained equal awards rule
• The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining

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