Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1254952


DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90008-4zbMath0399.90103MaRDI QIDQ1254952

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90008-4


91A05: 2-person games


Related Items

TWO CHARACTERISATIONS OF THE LEXICOGRAPHIC EGALITARIAN SOLUTION, An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate, The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate, On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results, Proportional concessions and the leximin solution, Continuity of bargaining solutions, A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria, Bargaining over the division of a shrinking pie: An axiomatic approach, Stability and the Nash solution, An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games, A class of solutions to bargaining problems, The lexicographic equal-loss solution, Rational equal-loss solutions for bargaining problems, Efficient solutions for bargaining problems with claims, The averaging mechanism., Weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric Nash solution, Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions, Duality, area-considerations, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, A generalization of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, The relevance of irrelevant alternatives, Nash bargaining in ordinal environments, Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms, On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game, Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions



Cites Work