The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.01.005zbMath1176.91006MaRDI QIDQ1042335

Yair Tauman, Artyom Jelnov

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; Shapley value; patent licensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments, The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees, Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market, Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations, Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities, A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

Cites Work

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